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Introduction
During last 60 years the world is experiencing rapid economical growth, which is hard to 
compare with anything that happened before. According to the World Bank, world GDP grow from 
1.35 trillion USD in year 1960 to more than 61 in trillions in 20081. A key feature of this growth is 
that previous predictions, which were based on forecasts of the dynamics of the working population 
and physical capital, were not very reliable. 
Because these forecasts were not reliable, people started to pay more attention to workers 
educational attainment in order to improve forecasts. Two major theories were proposed: human 
capital and signaling. Although the predictions of both theories are similar if we compare wages and 
earnings, their policy implications are completely different. One predicts the complete uselessness 
of education in terms of productivity, another makes it a crucial component of economic growth. 
There are also some propositions to combine both hypotheses to fit a model better to the data.
In this work I will try to find evidence of existing employees signaling their skill to their 
employer in the Polish labor market. To achieve that goal I will try to find evidence of a positive 
relationship between the intensity of tertiary education infrastructure and the probability that an 
individual will drop out of high school. To do that I will use a sample of the PGSS (Polish General 
Social  Survey – Social  Diagnosis),  consisting of answers to about 9 thousand respondents who 
provided information such as their educational attainment, place of living, and parents’ educational 
attainment. Restricting the sample to the years 1975 – 1998 (due to administrative reforms) I will 
make a logit estimation, which will help to evaluate the impact of tertiary education on high school 
dropouts.
In part one of my paper I will concentrate on human capital theory. First, I will present 
basic  concept  of  this  theory,  some  important  facts  concerning  history  of  this  theory  and  its 
development over time. After that I will describe the simplest model: the concept of specific and 
general training. I will end this section with presentations of empirical results of previous studies 
concerning human capital.
The second chapter will  be devoted to concept of signaling in education.  I will  briefly 
explain the theory, assumptions and a basic model proposed by Spence (1973). After that I will 
extend the model in several ways, by relaxing the assumptions of the strictly informative function 
of  the  model,  assuming  the  benefits  of  signaling,  and  trying  to  assess  level  of  investment  in 
education with majority voting.
Later I will present some previous studies, which were aimed at measuring importance of 
1 World Development Indicators 2010 by World Bank 
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human capital and signaling in the real world. This will include different ways of calculating these 
impacts, made by different authors on different samples.
I will devote the fourth part to present the database, variables, the motivation of choosing 
this specific period of time for the sample, and some descriptive statistics.
After that I will present the results of my estimations, different specifications of the model 
and the results calculated exclusively for male and female subsamples. The work will end with brief 
conclusions.
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PART I. HUMAN CAPITAL THEORY
Human  capital  theory  concerns   all  activities  that  may  increase  wages  in  the  future. 
According to the theory there is an efficient labor market in which workers are paid according to its 
productivity. Workers can “invest” in their  productivity by attending school, training,or relocating. 
This investment can lead to a relatively higher level of productivity of workers. Acquired skills give 
a competitive advantage and help workers to earn higher wages.
1.1. Short history of the theory
In the late 1950's and early 1960's many countries were experiencing fast economic growth 
and significant increases in school enrollment. At that time, people started to consider educational 
expenses as an investment.  For example,  in  Hague in 1959, someone suggested that  there  is  a 
positive correlation between a qualified workforce and economic growth.  
Schultz (1961) and Becker (1975) are considered to be the fathers of human capital theory, 
although even Adam Smith mentions it. Adam Smith (1776) in his famous book Wealth of Nations 
wrote:
“Fourthly,  of the acquired and useful abilities of all  the inhabitants or members of the 
society. The acquisition of such talents, by the maintenance of the acquirer during his education, 
study, or apprenticeship, always costs a real expense, which is a capital fixed and realized, as it 
were, in his person. Those talents, as they make a part of his fortune, so do they likewise that of the 
society to which he belongs. The improved dexterity of a workman may be considered in the same 
light as a machine or instrument of trade which facilitates and abridges labor, and which, though it 
costs a certain expense, repays that expense with a profit.”2 
 But no formal theory was made until the second half of the twentieth century. A theory 
proposing another type of capital – human capital - was proposed by Schultz in a response to the 
growing discrepancies between the growth rates of the labor force and physical capital, compared to 
GDP growth. He argued that,  with the evolution of labor activities, human capital started to be 
responsible for a significant share of GDP. In the era of classical economists, workers employed in 
the manufacturing industries were doing very simple and repeatable tasks which did not demand 
high skills or education. The great success of Henry Ford in the beginning of the 20 th century was to 
combine division of labor (which increase labor productivity) with delegation of simple repeatable 
2 Smith, Adam: An Inquiry into the Nature And Causes of the Wealth of Nations Book 2 - Of the Nature,  
Accumulation, and Employment of Stock; Published 1776. 
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tasks to uneducated workers (which made them easy replaceable). But this business model became 
less applicable in the 50's and 60's. 
At that time physical capital as a share of total output was getting lower although in it was 
assumed  to  be  fixed  (for  example  this  is  one  of  the  assumptions  of  Solow  Growth  Model). 
However,  the  lower  income  for  farmer  workers  who  switched  to  non-farming  sectors,  or  the 
different employment opportunities for young and old people could not be explained under this 
assumption. Schultz’ explanation of these phenomena was that one type of capital (physical) was 
replaced by other one (human). That was the cause of higher economic growth than was expected 
observing  data  on  hours  worked  and  stocks  of  physical  capital.  Farmers  employed  in  other 
industries were lacking sector-specific knowledge, which made them relatively less productive and 
resulted in lower wages. He also argued that younger job seekers had a higher probability of being 
employed because they finished not 6 but 12 years of education on average. Classical theories of 
economics failed to explain this, so Schultz’ theory of capital formation quickly gained popularity. 
1.2. Specificity of Human Capital
There are significant differences between human and physical capital:
1. Human capital theory concentrates on the laborer, not on the owner or manager of the firm.
2. The workforce are „investors” in the scope of this work; they decide whether or not to 
acquire skills and continue education.
3. Human Capital cannot be acquired by exchange nor in the simple production process.
4. Firm cannot purchase human capital; it can be only rented from the workers.
Schultz  anticipated problems with measuring human capital  and,  therefore,  divided the 
investment expenditure in human capital into five major components: (1) health infrastructure and 
services, which increases people expected life duration, health and stamina; (2) on-the-job training, 
including apprenticeship and various trainings organized for the employees by the company; (3) 
formally organized education at the elementary, secondary, and higher levels; (4) study programs 
for adults that are not organized by firms, including extension programs notably in agriculture; (5) 
spending on the migration of individuals to find job which will use larger share of worker skills and 
which mean higher earning for them. According to Becker (1975) every activity that leads to an 
increase in human wages by not investing in physical capital can be considered a human capital 
investment. 
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1.3. Simple Model
Becker  (1962)  was  the  first  person  to  formally  propose  a  human  capital  theory.  His 
motivation in developing such a model was because “theories of firm behavior, no matter how they 
differ  in  other  respects,  almost  invariably ignore  the  effect  of  the  productive  process  itself  on 
worker  productivity”3.  He  argued  that  apprenticeship,  or  on-  the-  job  training,  raises  worker 
productivity but is a costly process (which is why demand for such training is limited). The cost 
must be included not only in the resources devoted for such training, but also in the time and effort 
of the workers involved. It is assumed that the labor and product markets are perfectly competitive. 
In a simple one-period model with these conditions, the marginal product of labor is equal to the 
wage, because neither the employee, nor employer have an incentive to invest in the given worker’s 
productivity. This changes when a worker stays on the market for several periods and the possibility 
of training exists. Then the simple equality between wages and marginal product is transformed into
1. MP0+G = W0+ C, where
MP0 – worker productivity in time 0
G – discounted present value of investment in training
W0 – wages in period 0
C – cost of training
Now the marginal product in first period is equal to wages if and only if the net present 
value of the investment in training is equal to 0. Yet  who finances this investment and who will 
benefit from it? The answer is one of the most popular in economics – it depends. It depends on the 
type of training this employee  receives and whether or not the abilities acquired in the process of 
training can be used in other firms. Becker proposes to divide the training into two subgroups: 
general and specific.
1.4. General Training
 General training is related to employee attributes such as competency, the ability to apply 
knowledge, and personality attributes, which increase the potential wage of the worker throughout 
the labor market. On the other hand, if change of one of this characteristics change only person 
productivity in given sector/firm without affecting “market valuation” of  given person then we can 
say that this is specific training. Will the company has incentives to invest in the general training of 
3 Becker, Gary S. 1962. "Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis." Journal of Political Economy 70 
(October 1962): p. 10 
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employees?  Firms  would  have  incentive  for  such  investments  only  if  the  productivity  of  the 
workers would grow faster than their wages and the firm could at least partially profit from these 
investments. But this is impossible in a perfectly competitive labor market – workers who receive 
training can be employed by other companies for higher wages. To secure itself from the loss of the 
worker, the firm would have to pay wages equal to this marginal cost,  in which case it has no 
incentive to provide general training. Yet firms provide general training, but only when they are not 
bearing the costs. Workers who want to have this type of training have to finance it themselves.
This  can  be  shown using  equation  1.  Because  the  training  in  general  skills  increases 
worker valuation, the net benefit from an investment is equal to 0, because increases in productivity 
are outweighed by higher wages. So firms do not gain anything. If we calculate the base wage 
(worker salary in period 1) we have:
2. W0 = MP0 - C, because G = 0
Wages do not equal the marginal product but is diminished by the cost of training. If the employee 
wants to earn more in the future, they need to sacrifice present consumption. That is the reason why 
internship earnings are low and sometimes negative (including cost of accommodation) although 
these employees’ life-time earning are high.
General training has a large impact on labor earnings. On one hand it lowers wages due to 
financing the general training; on the other hand new skills increase worker productivity, which 
increase their productivity. That makes future earnings higher than they would have been without 
training. The graph below represents the hypothetical evolution of wages in time.
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Picture 1. Different lifetime income for different training investment profiles.
Line UU shows the typical worker’s lifetime wages without receiving general training. His 
earnings are constant through his whole life (ceteris paribus). When starting work his earnings are 
the highest compared to other workers, due to a lack of training. The worker earns his potential 
level of earnings because he is not investing anything in future productivity.
Line TT is an example of a worker who continuously optimizes his level of investment in 
training. At the beginning of his working career this investment will be beneficial for a long time 
(whole working life),  which makes  this  kind of investments  very attractive.  What  is  more,  the 
worker is young and does not has any type of training so learning is relatively fast and cheap – 
achieving  basic  knowledge about  the  work will  significantly raise  his  productivity.  That  is  the 
reason why, in the beginning, earnings are so low and rise sharply. Personal incentives to invest are 
very high, which makes the worker postpone a large share of current consumption for a higher one 
in the future. During the later stages of a worker’s career, these incentives decrease and earnings 
increases are smaller; the curve became concave instead of convex.  We can see that the difference 
in earnings between a worker who is optimizing his level of training and his counterpart who has 
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constant  earnings  is  the  distance  between  U  and  T.  At  the  beginning  of  theis  career,  the 
disproportion in wages is very high. But when time goes by this gap is narrowing and in the end of 
their careers, person TT earns much more than UU.  
Curve T'T' corresponds to the theoretical worker who has invested in training only in first 
period and after that became passive and was benefiting only from this training in next periods of 
his working life.
In conclusion, general training should be financed  by the worker and not the employer 
because, due to opportunistic worker behavior and the firm’s inability to extract rent from more 
educated units, firms have no incentive to invest in workers. Becker (1962) gave the example of 
staff rotation in the American army. Recruits have a wide variety of training that can be used in the 
civilian sector like machine repairing or piloting. Training which is mainly provided in first period 
of military service is negatively correlated with the reenlistment rates; the more training soldiers 
receive, the higher is the probability that will leave the army. This is because wages are significantly 
higher in civilian sector than in army, and although there is motivation to join the army to acquire 
new skills, there is no such motivation to continue a career there. One of the most striking examples 
are pilots in commercial American airlines who, in an overwhelming majority, began their career in 
the armed forces.
1.5. Specific Training
On the other hand, there are some jobs in the military that require a high level of skills and 
training but where the turnover rate is significantly lower. Astronauts or rocket service specialists 
are less willing to leave the army for the private sector. Questions arise concerning this phenomena: 
Why do those people not leave army in order to achieve higher wages elsewhere? They are high 
skilled employees with sophisticated and specialist training. They are eligible for the same wages as 
pilots. The answer is simple – they are not leaving the army because they would earn less in private 
sector.  Although this  group of  workers  receives  significant  amounts  of  training,  their  resulting 
abilities have no practical use in the private sector. It is clear that some of the training allows the 
workers to acquire level skills which can only be implemented in firms that provide the training, 
and has no impact on worker productivity in other firms/sectors. Training which increases worker 
productivity in a given firm but keeps productivity of the same worker constant outside the firm is 
an idealized example of specific training. Job training is often specific to the firm, for example, 
familiarizing workers with the structure of the firm is a specific type of training, in which company 
will  likely  invest  because  it  will  benefit  the  company  yet  have  no  impact  on  worker  market 
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valuation and could not be used in other firms.
The effect of investment in worker skills on productivity in other firms depends to some 
extent on market conditions. A monopolist has on market more specific knowledge than firms that 
operate in a highly competitive market. It is due to market concentration – the less firms operate, 
the more specific is knowledge from given industry.
The fact that specific human capital has a dissimilar impact on different firms has several 
implications concerning the investment patterns and sources of investments in human capital. In a 
hypothetical market, where every training is a specific one, wages available on the market would be 
completely independent from the amount of training a worker received. It is because of specificity 
of the acquired skills – they are useless in other firms. If that would be the case, workers would not 
have incentives for paying for training because it would be at a pure economic loss for them. In that 
case firms will be prone to invest,  because they are the only ones to benefit from the workers’ 
higher productivity. So, whenever costs outweigh the benefits, firms devote resources to training. 
This can be presented as the following equation:
3. MP'0 + G[∑ (MPt – Wt)/(1+i)t] = W0+ C, where
MP'0 – worker productivity in time 0
G – discounted present value of investment in training
W0 – worker opportunity wage in period 0
C – cost of training worker in period 0
MPt – worker marginal productivity in period t
Wt – worker wages in period t
In that situation wage rate W is a wage rate that can be achieved on the market and it does not 
depend on the quantity of training that the worker received. It is also worth mentioning that MP'0 
should be rather considered as opportunity and not the real marginal product. In that case MPt – Wt 
is a return from the investment which is completely acquired by the firm, employee return to the 
investment is equal to 0. But does this mean that the situation where employees cover the costs of 
training and receive all benefits is not possible?  It depends on the turnover rate. On one hand it is 
an undesirable situation for the firm to lose its employee in which they invested, but on the other 
hand workers also suffer capital losses if they are laid off from the job. If the worker is privately 
financing his training, the firm has no incentive to keep him employed when layoffs are required. 
On the other hand, workers with specific knowledge funded by firms is more precious to them and 
their loss is related with financial losses of firm. Employers recognize this process and offer higher 
wages in order to stop or decrease the turnover of specialist staff. Firms pay for workers equipped 
with  general  human capital  wages  that  they can  achieve  anywhere  else  and pay workers  with 
11
specialized  knowledge  higher  wages  than  those  that  they  could  potentially  earn  at  a  different 
company.  On the other  hand, employee-financed specific  training has similar  effects  to  general 
training, making the payout profile of workers steeper and more concave. 
Specific (and sponsored by employer) training because of different sources of financing and 
benefiting in comparison to general training also causes firms to behave differently. Workers are 
less prone to quit that firm because of their specific training and the firm wants to keep them in 
order to continue “renting” the workers skill, a result of the investment that the firm made. Lets 
consider a situation, where a firm is facing a negative shock that decreases employees productivity 
but is sufficiently small that rest of the economy is not affected. The firm’s response to such a 
situation is to decrease the wages of workers with general training (or to fire them) to outbalance 
the costs of the shock. Both of these responses will lead to generally trained workers leaving the 
firm.  The  situation  is  different  with  specialized  workers  who  earn  less  than  their  short-term 
productivity. If a productivity fall is smaller than company profits for a given person then the firm 
will have no incentive to layoff this worker. What is more, even in a more severe but temporal crisis 
when productivity falls below wages, the firm still would not want to lay off specialists because 
there is a risk that given person will be employed in different firm and its investment in training 
would be lost forever. So we can see that the probability that that person will be fired is negatively 
correlated with the amount of investment sponsored by the employer.
1.6. On – the – job training according to different authors
 Becker was not the first economist who recognized problem of financing on – the – job 
training.  Even  before  World  War  I,  Pigou  (1912)  argued  that  firms  would  not  have  efficient 
incentives to invest in skills of their workers, due to the uncertainty concerning workers leaving the 
firm for a better paid job. Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) while analyzing situation and proposing future 
plans of rebuilding economy in Eastern and South – Eastern Europe, stressed the fact that training 
would  be  the  factor  that  boosts  the  economy and increases  the  speed  of  industrialization.  But 
according to him it will not happen only by market forces. He postulate larger share of government 
spending in GDP of states and international loans to this region. These early contributions to the 
human capital theory did not distinguishing between specific and general training. That view was 
created mostly by Becker, who argued that firms should invest (cover the cost of investment) in that 
kind of human capital to bind the employee with the given firm. This would decrease the risk of 
losing already invested capital due to worker independence.
Some alternatives to Becker’s theories explaining firm behavior exists. Loewenstein and 
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Spletzer (1998) using the 1988-91 NLSY data base find out that the employer bears most of the 
costs related to training. But the stunning thing is that the findings presented above hold even if 
general training is considered. Authors propose a model which explains this behavior, which at first 
glance  seems  to  be  illogical.  Sharing  training  funding  between  both  sides  is  caused  by  the 
employer’s lack of credibility to commit to future wages. By offering an employee this kind of 
training, the employer increases the future valuation of the worker. In that case he is forced to pay 
more to  the employee  to  decrease his  quitting rate.  The employer  may thus shares  the cost  of 
specific  as  well  as  general  training.  Autor  (2001)  proposes  a  different  explanation  of  these 
phenomena. He assumes incomplete information in the labor market and complementarity between 
abilities and general skills training. Usually higher demand for general training in this model means 
that the worker  is  more productive.  Training induces a self  – selection of employees,  which is 
related  to  the  screening  hypothesis  on  which  I  will  concentrate  later.  Cost  of  the  training  is 
indirectly financed by the employees – their wage level is significantly below marginal productivity. 
1.7. Empirical Research
Human  capital  theory  gained  popularity  very  quickly  and,  although  modified,  has 
expanded in past years without losing its validity. Its usefulness is to explain the differences in 
wages more precisely.  Larger variation in income could be explained by the different levels of 
education or more work experience. So this theory differentiates the labor force and workers were 
not homogenous any more. Many authors argued that predictions of considered theory fits to the 
reality based on empirical data.  There is a problem with early empirical works. There were not too 
reliable measures about on-the-job training which seems to largely explain wage levels. But in 1975 
Becker (1975) argued that every additional year in college increases  an average worker’s salary by 
10-12%, which supports human capital theory (HC). Freeman (1976) in his research came to the 
conclusion that during the 1960's, the relative remuneration of people with college education in 
comparison with high school alumni rose sharply. Likewise, studies explaining wage growth paths 
are mostly consistent with human capital theory.  Neumark and Taubman (1995) tested a general 
human capital theory using NLSY database. These authors came to conclusion that young workers 
who are on the labor market for short period of time, sacrifice their current income in exchange for 
higher earnings in the future. This relationship maybe opposite for older workers. Also in favor of 
HC, but using different estimation techniques, was research conducted by Reilly (1995). Results 
showed that differences in remunerations between small and big companies seem to be insignificant 
when several proxies of HC are included.
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Neal’s (1995) research goes further to suggest some extensions to Becker’s basic theory. 
Using displaced worker surveys (DWS) he calculated not only the costs of switching to other firms 
in the same industry but also to switching industries. His results showed that the simple division of 
human capital (general and specific) is insufficient because some industry-specific human capital 
also exists.
Unfortunately some studies that are use more direct data about the human capital fail to 
support  Becker’s  theory.  Hansson (2009)  researched the  consulting  establishment  where  HC is 
crucial and concludes that employers are able to extract returns from general trainings. His studies 
are in line with Barren (1999), who concludes that employers pay for most of the trainings (even 
general)  and  extract  most  of  the  rent  from this  investment.  Autor  (2001)  argue  that  firms  can 
temporarily pay for general skills training because it is in their business. Acemoglu and Pischke 
(1998) found out that employers take on the costs of apprenticeship although skills learned there are 
applicable across firms. Becker’s theory predicts that employers are not willing to pay for general 
training because perfect information and labor mobility is assumed, which is quite controversial. 
That is why Katz and Ziderman (1990) postulate that an entrepreneur may be willing to invest in 
general training because workers do not know about their employment opportunities in different 
firms and are unwilling to pay the transaction costs related to changing to a new workplace. 
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PART II. SIGNALING THEORY
A simple theory explaining the higher income of more educated persons was presented 
above. The theory suggested that people who attain higher levels of education are more productive. 
Does it  fully explain this  relationship?  According to  the father of human capital  theory (HC): 
“General  observation  indicates  that  college  graduates  tend  to  be  more  "able"  than  high-school 
graduates, apart from the effect of college education”4 This is an argument against HC and in favor 
of  an  alternative  wage  differential  theory,  the  screening  (signaling)  hypothesis.  The  screening 
hypothesis assumes that schooling does not increase a given worker’s productivity, but helps firms 
to differentiate low and high productivity workers in the job market.
2.1.Introduction
Micheal Spence is known as the father of signaling theory. In his classic work (1973) he 
proposed  an  education  model  that  is  significantly  different  from HC.  He argued  that  Becker’s 
assumption of symmetric, full, free and instantly achieved information does not match reality, and 
that hiring is a process that involves uncertainty. Employers are not certain about employee skills or 
knowledge when employing a new worker. What is more, they may not achieve this knowledge 
instantly  after  hiring  them because  it  takes  time  to  learn  a  worker’s  productivity.  This  is  the 
uncertainty  that  Spence  highlighted.  He  argued  that  “To  hire  someone,  then,  is  frequently  to 
purchase a lottery”5, where the cost of purchasing a lottery ticket is identified with the wage paid to 
the  employee.  Although  the  entrepreneur  cannot  observe  productivity  characteristics  of  given 
workers, but it does not mean he is unable to observe any characteristics. Information about gender, 
age, education, sex, race, criminal record and many more features are readily available during the 
employment process.  
It is clear that some of these characteristics are exogenous (age, sex) while others can be 
influenced by the potential employee (for example education). In literature there is a clear division 
concerning these characteristics; exogenous ones are called “indices” while endogenous ones are 
“signals”.  The former traits  are given less consideration due to market participants’ inability to 
affect them and the latter ones are considered first but are are optimized by employees to maximize 
their earnings/utility.
According to this model an employer will learn average worker productivity after some 
4 Becker ,G. (1975) A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to Education, 2nd ed. NBER p.232
5 Spence, A. Michael, "Job Market Signaling," Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 1973, 87, p. 356.
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period of time. On this basis he can evaluate new candidates more precisely. Indices and signals 
affect conditional probability that the person is (not) a high ability one. Employees also can observe 
impact of indices and signals on employment opportunities and choose a given level of the latter to 
maximize their salaries. This in turn affects labor market conditional probabilities.
2.2.Assumptions
Signaling theory assumes that whole population (at least in terms of productivity) can be 
described by one parameter Θ which measure personal productivity. In simplest model people can 
be or high ability Θ1 or low Θ2 (its mean that the work which efficient type will make in one hour, 
for inefficient laborer it takes Θ1/Θ2 hours which is greater than one. It is convenient to set price of 
produced good to 1. The share of highly productive workers in the population is denoted by h1. Next 
we assume that although workers know their own type, employers do not posses this information. It 
is also assumed that firms operate in perfectly competitive environments and are risk neutral (which 
greatly simplify calculations). Moreover, employers cannot directly observe productivity of given 
worker or cost of achieving this knowledge is prohibitively high but average workers productivity is 
observable  and  free.  Next,  a  simplifying  assumption  states  that  there  are  no  others  factors  of 
production. In basic model it is also assumed that workers wage is perfectly inelastic
Perfect competition between firms guarantees that workers are remunerated according to 
their productivity. Because employers are unable to distinguish between the two types of workers, 
they weight their wages based onboth types of productivity, which is equal to:
1.  h1Θ1+(1-h1)Θ2=ΘAVERAGE
 As we can see Θ1> ΘAVERAGE> Θ2 so workers from first group have an incentive to identify 
themselves as highly productive. Unfortunately it is impossible (or not cost effective) to directly 
sort  them according to their  productivity.  On the other hand, it  is  possible for able workers to 
convince employers that they are more productive, or at least that it is more likely that they are 
more productive. It can be done in two ways:
− by  having  different  indices  which  is  independent  of  workers  will,  agent  cannot 
influence this statistics, which Make them less attractive in point of view of optimizing agent
− by  having  different  signals  that  suggest  a  workers  productivity  level  and  are 
determined by individual decision making based on a choice that is influenced by an individual’s 
personal opportunity costs– here agents optimization behavior can be observed.
Spence (1973) proposed to consider education as one of the type of signal. He argues that 
productive workers will try to invest that much in education to distinguish themselves from workers 
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with lower productivity levels.  The problem they face is in maximizing the difference between 
offered  wages  and  the  cost  related  to  achieving  a  certain  level  of  education.  Here  it  is  worth 
mentioning one of the most crucial assumption in this theory. It is assumed that costs of education 
are negatively correlated with a given worker’s productivity. To assume that less able workers are 
facing greater  cost  of attending school  is  so important,  because if  this  condition would not  be 
fulfilled,  then  they would  have  incentives  to  mimic  high  productivity  workers.  We should  not 
consider signaling cost only in terms of cash, it involves time and effort as well.
2.3. Simple Model
Lets assume that the cost of education is linear. Higher productivity workers face the cost 
of education c1  equal to y1, which is the number of years spent in school, while low productivity 
workers face proportionately higher costs:
2.  y1 = c
3.  y2=ac, where a>0
The equilibrium depends heavily on market participants’ beliefs. Spencer (1973) assumed 
that there is some level of education y* that guarantees full separation on the market. If a person 
achieves at least this level of education (y ≥ y*), then,  with probability equal to one, we can say 
that this person has high abilities. On the other hand if a person spend less years in school (y < y*) 
then employer is 100% sure that he employ a low ability worker. With given conditional beliefs 
about this worker productivity, the employer (firms operate in a perfectly competitive market) will 
set a wage rate W(y) equal to the suspected marginal productivity of this worker, which is Θ1  for 
more productive and Θ2 for less productive workers.
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Picture 2. Relationship between earning and level of education according to simple 
Signaling Theory.
With the wage schedule as follows,  members of each group will  choose their  level  of 
education optimally. Here we should ask what is the optimal level of education. If a person is of 
high abilities, then his optimal level of education will be y*. There is no reason to spend more time 
in the schooling system because, as we assumed on the beginning, education do not increase our 
productivity and apart of gains from signaling it is purely wasteful. Similarly, people for whom it is 
beneficial to learn less than y* will not attend school at all (y = 0). So we can see that everyone will 
be going to school for y* years or will not attend at all, because it is not productive and does not 
influence  employers’ beliefs.  Employees  will  choose  education  levels  according  to  employers’ 
beliefs and by doing so they confirm those beliefs, guaranteeing a signaling equilibrium.
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Picture 3. Optimal choice of education for low and high – skilled workers.
We can now state the conditions that must be fulfilled to confirm entrepreneurs beliefs. 
Group One will will learn exactly y* years if the cost of achieving this knowledge will be lower 
than gains from learning (which does not sound really unrealistic).
4. Θ1 – Θ2 > y*
And for low productivity workers, the cost of education must be higher than any potential 
benefits:
5. Θ1 – ay* < Θ2
If we compute both conditions, we will  achieve an interval of parameter y* for which 
market expectations will be fulfilled. This happens when:
6. (Θ1 - Θ2 ) / a < y* < (Θ1 – Θ2)
Here we see that there is an infinite number of stable equilibria. The optimal value of y is 
an interval, so if we assume that the variable is continuous, then we also have infinite numbers of y 
that will fulfill given conditions. For example, if parameter y* will increase by ∆y is small enough 
for optimal level of education to be still somewhere between lower and upper limit, it will hurt 
group One (more  productive),  because  right  now they will  have  to  spend an additional  ∆y on 
education, while as mentioned before productivity(=gross wages) will not be affected. On the other 
hand, this will not change the behavior of the second group because they are not investing anything 
in education. But this group already faced losses when employers differentiated workers for able 
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and less able based on education levels. If  there is  no differentiation with respect to education 
according to equation (1) all employees are remunerated equally. Wage ratio is equal to ΘAVERAGE 
and the difference in their earnings is equal to:
7. ΘAVERAGE - Θ2 = h * ( Θ1 – Θ2) 
So the losses are the more severe the bigger is productivity gap, and the larger is the share 
of laborers from first group. Therefore, unskilled workers are always worse off when differentiation 
according to education is implemented. On the other hand, skilled workers gain less than the second 
group losses due to expenditures on education. To be precise, even able workers may be worse off 
due to signaling. It will be profitable for these workers to attain high levels of education  if and only 
if wage gains will be higher than the cost of signaling their high abilities. Resulting in:
8. y* < Θ1- ΘAVERAGE → y* < (1 – h) * (Θ1 – Θ2)   
 If the number of unskilled workers will relatively decrease in comparison to skilled ones, 
or  if  the wage gap will  be lower,  the probability that  group one will  gain from differentiating 
themselves will be lower. This mean that a higher share of educated people will shift the average 
wage up, which has 2 simultaneous effects: it makes able workers less willing to invest in education 
to  distinguish  themselves,  and  makes  low ability  workers  more  willing  to  imitate  high  skilled 
people.  The same effect  is  when productivity gap is  growing.  Although every person is  acting 
rationally  with  respect  to  their  own private  interest,  the  outcome may not  be  efficient.  In  that 
situation limiting access to education would lead to improvement in the Pareto sense. If workers 
could form sufficiently large coalition, it would pay off not to educate themselves at all. On the 
other  hand  if  the  difference  between  high  and  average  productivity  is  sufficiently  high  to 
compensate for education spending, “able” rational agents will tend to invest in that signal.
One more thing which requires emphasis is that private and social returns in this model 
differ significantly! We cannot observe that gross social returns of schooling in this model are equal 
to 0, because learning does not have productivity effects, but only signaling ones. On the other 
hand, an individual proving that he is of high productivity results in an increase in his wages. The 
social return is equal to [(Θ1 – Θ2)/c] – 1 for high skilled and [(Θ1 – Θ2)/ac] – 1 for low skilled. But 
does  this  mean  that  government  can  improve  this  imperfection?  It  is  impossible  because  as 
mentioned before we cannot easily observe productivity of single workers.
2.4. Extensions
2.4.1. Can signals improve the social equilibrium?
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During past 40 years this basic model of signalling was developed in many ways. Almost 
every assumption was lifted or relaxed and the outcomes of such moves were presented. Stiglitz 
(1975) proposed situations when social returns of signaling can be higher than zero.
The first of such situations deal with the consumption- leisure tradeoff. He argued that 
imperfect information work like taxes on more able and subsidy on less able. Assuming that cost of 
education for high-ability people is relatively low in comparison with those who are less productive, 
and with the assumption that labor is supplied elastically and everyone can be better of due to 
differentiation.  This can be done by using a tailored redistribution tax.  This proposal has some 
drawbacks. First of all, it is not guaranteed that such a tax mechanism could be implemented. It may 
also be that the administrative costs of sustaining such a system would be greater than the benefits.
Also,  the  benefits  from  a  social  point  of  view  from  education  is  better  employee  – 
workplace  matching.  Let’s  relax  the  assumption  of  describing  worker  productivity  by  one 
parameter;  low  productivity  workers  can  be  more  productive  (or  at  least  have  a  comparative 
advantage) in working in different professions than highly skilled workers. High ability workers can 
be very productive while working in office, but while performing physical work their productivity 
can be less productive than their highly educated counterparts. On the other hand are low skilled 
workers whose “office” productivity is low and “physical” productivity is relatively better. If we 
assume that office workers perform relatively better in school, then differentiation will increase the 
total wealth of society. The effect can be greater if we assume that total productivity is not the sum 
of all productivity but less able workers have greater impact on rest of the group productivity. In 
this case, distinguishing workers and employing them even on the same position but in two separate 
workplaces increases total output. 
As  we  can  see  above,  a  private  and  socially  desirable  level  of  investment  can  differ 
significantly. On one hand, pooling equilibrium put all individuals to the same group where people 
support others’ wages, or are supported by more able people. Investment in education can be seen in 
an individual point of view as profitable, but in general it is only a waste of resources. This is not 
the case when distinguishing workers allows society to organize workers in way which increases the 
total output, even while with holding personal characteristics constant. What is more, differentiating 
eliminates costs related to subsidizing of one group by another, which is strictly private but has no 
social return. To sum it up, Stiglitz (1975) argued that according to market conditions education 
investments can be too small or too large from a social standpoint. What is more, there can be no 
strict market mechanism that will guarantee an optimal level of investments.
2.4.2. Signaling plus Human Capital
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Another  extension  was  to  relax  the  assumption  of  considering  education  as  absolutely 
wasteful in terms of personal productivity. It was proposed due to many studies testing signaling, 
with inconclusive outcomes. The theory was divided according to the impact on productivity of the 
weak screening hypothesis (WSH) and the strong screening hypothesis (SSH). According to the 
SSH, education has absolutely no impact on given person productivity, while WSH assume that the 
education  is  not  purely  informative  but  can  also  have  an  impact  on  productivity.  While 
Psacharopoulos (1979) argued that role of education is purely signaling, Arrow (1973) and Spence 
(1973)  admit  that  increase  in  productivity  caused  by education  is  possible.  The  second author 
(2002)  proposed an extension in  which worker value depends on their  level  of education.  The 
definitions of new variables are as follows: si (y) is a value of i – type worker whospend y years in 
school. Because there are only two types of workers i = 1 or 2, and we assume that s2 (y) > s1 (y), 
this  means  that  the  impact  of  education  on  productivity  is  greater  for  able  persons  and  their 
marginal return of education is higher, ceteris paribus, in comparison with less able counterparts. 
Another crucial assumption, identical as was made before, states that the cost of education is lower 
for group one and bigger for group two (c2 (y) > c1 (y)). Employers still cannot observe worker 
productivity directly. It is also assumed that the cost function is increasing and convex while the 
worker productivity function increases in a concave manner. This assumption is important from a 
technical point  of view because it  provides the stability of the model.  Because of that,  the net 
income function Ni = si (y) – ci  (y) is a concave function. The last function we define is V = s1 (y) – 
c2 (y) which illustrates the decision of low ability workers to mimic the skilled ones.
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Picture 4. Signaling Theory with elements of human capital. Outcome with optimal 
level of educational investment.
Three  different  outcomes  of  this  study are  possible.  The  most  standard  outcome fully 
separates equilibrium. Points y1* and y2* are the optimal years spent in school, which maximizes 
expected return on education.  Point yAVERAGE show the latest range of education, for which it is 
profitable to mimic high skilled workers. If the y1* would lied left to yAVERAGE then low able people 
had an incentive to invest  more than is  local  maximum calculated by the returns to  education, 
because profits of playing high skilled are greater that the costs. When the point y1* is on the right 
side (as on the picture) then it does not pay off to invest that much in education, because costs will 
be greater than the benefits. People invest in optimal levels of education from a social standpoint 
because of significant differences in education, employers can fully differentiate the people. So, not 
only  is  the  the  investment  level  optimal,  but  the  market  also  behaves  as  if  there  was  perfect 
competition. Perfect competition can be achieved because the cost of education differs significantly. 
Without this assumption, rational agents with lower productivity would stay in school as much as 
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their more productive counterparts.
Lets now consider situation similar to that one described above. Figure 5 
Picture  5.  Signaling  Theory  with  elements  of  human  capital.  Outcome  with 
overinvestment in education.
The  only  difference  is  in  years  of  education  of  able  persons  for  which  lifetime  income  is 
maximized.  Now  it  is  to  the  left  to  yAVERAGE.  This  one  detail  changes  the  whole  structure  of 
equilibrium. Let’s assume that high skilled workers chose education levels where their marginal 
cost of education is equal to the resulting marginal increase in productivity. Then, low productivity 
workers have a temptation to educate themselves insufficiently high (in social point of view) just to 
mimic them. Productive people will tend to invest in their education more just in order to prove that 
there are more productive. The minimal number of years spent in school for them is more than 
yAVERAGE,  because  this  is  the  border  point.  Right  to  this  point  they  can  be  sure  that  no  low 
productivity workers  will  try to  mimic them. We can  observe  here the  same type  of  signaling 
equilibrium as in the pure signaling model. Although a human capital component is included and 
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the less able group partially participate in education according to this theory, the rest overinvest in 
education (in human capital point of view) to signal their abilities, which cause losses from a social 
point of view.
The last hypothesized outcome is when it  does not pay off for high ability workers to 
differentiate themselves. The question is when that kind of equilibrium will occur.  Keeping the 
nomenclature as in the previous example lets define h as the share of high skilled persons in the 
population. In pooling, equilibrium wage ratio is a weighted average of workers productivity: h* s1 
(y) + (1-h)* s2 (y) = sAVERAGE (y). Let h be close to one because the number of low skilled workers in 
total population is relatively low. Then the average earnings of these workers are very similar to 
high skilled workers’ payout profiles. Then, workers have no incentives to differentiate themselves 
because net payoffs are greater now when the equilibrium is a pooling one. As h decreases in our 
hypothetical case, pooling equilibrium becomes less and less profitable. When the average earnings 
fall below more able people earnings in separating equilibrium minus their cost of education, for 
that values of h equilibrium will be separating because it will not pay off any longer to “subsidize” 
their less efficient counterparts. 
As we could see earlier, if the share of skilled persons is not too high in total population, 
fully  separating  equilibrium is  possible.  A problem arises  when  education  is  used  not  only to 
maximize worker productivity minus his costs of education, but exceed social optimum. Then, there 
is  wealth  loss  due  to  overinvestment  in  education.  Is  there  a  way  to  improve  this  market 
imperfection? It appears that such a policy is possible, net income can be increased by appropriate 
policy measures.  By imposing a tax on education it  can increase consumption in the economy. 
Taxation of education is beneficial in the sense that it discourages overinvesting and makes a threat 
of low productivity workers pretending to be the more efficient ones less possible. 
To sum up, considering a signaling model with an added human capital component it is 
possible to have three outcomes: a fully efficient separating equilibrium or a separating equilibrium, 
where educational  expenditures  are  suboptimal.  It  is  also possible to have pooling equilibrium, 
where both groups earn the same amount of money assuming that the proportion of able workers is 
sufficiently large.  It  is  also possible  to  correct  market  failures  using  appropriate  tax  policy on 
education.
2.4.3. Majority Voting
We can see that the educational system is crucial in signaling models with and without 
productivity gains from education. It is a crucial tool to signal to the employer (or to be screened 
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by  him)  that  the  person  is  more  productive  than  the  average.  Sometimes,  due  to  market 
imperfections, situation on the market is suboptimal and wisely planned government actions could 
lead to wealth gains. But, the person could ask if the situation with the state intervening on the 
market is always a realistic scenario. Does the government under the pressure of some group of 
voters  will  put  off  the actions that  would lead to increase in  total  wealth? For  these questions 
Stiglitz (1975) was trying to answer this model using slightly different model, which was extended 
to include some predictions of human capital. Still, it is assumed that individual characteristics can 
be described by one parameter Θ, and the distribution of parameter Θ in total population is given by 
function h(Θ). New thing in this model is  so-called “intensity” of the education marked as λ. It is 
assumed that more intensive education
• cost more
• increase productivity of the worker  greater  (no matter  if  it  is  due to  acquiring skills  or 
simply by better employee – job matching
• allow workers to better signal their productivity
Which can be identified as y – number of years spent in school in previous model. 
Impact of given parameters is as follows:
Productivity effect – p(Θ, λ) described productivity of given person who is of the Θ type 
able and received education of intensity λ. For simplicity it is assumed that output of given worker 
linearly increase in Θ and is concavely increase education intensity:
9. p(Θ, λ) = m(λ)*Θ, where m' > 0 and m'' < 0.
Screening  effect  –  educational  system  improve  identifying  given  person  abilities.  If 
e(Θ, Θi , λ) is a probability that given person is of type Θi, then this probability increase in λ.
Educational costs are increase with intensity of the schooling λ. What is more, this  cost are 
increasing convexly, twice as high intensity will lead lead to more than two times  
10. c' > 0 and c'' > 0
To determine equilibrium in the model it  is required to wages of the worker. If person 
ability was estimated to be Θi, then his expected wage is equal to:
11. w(Θi) = m(λ) ∫ Θ e(Θ, Θi , λ) h(Θ) dΘ / ∫ e(Θ, Θi , λ) h(Θ) dΘ
and the wage of a person, whose ability parameter is Θ is as follows:
12. W(Θ) = ∫ w(Θi) e(Θ, Θi , λ) d Θi
Maximizing  national  output  minus  costs  of  education  it   turns  out  that  the  marginal  cost  of 
education must be equal  to marginal average benefit of the education: 
13. c'(λ) =  ΘAVERAGE m' (λ)
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This is the desired level of investments Question arise if this is the level of investment that will be 
achieved in a state,  where decisions are made by majority voting,  where educational system is 
financed by proportional wage tax τ, then :
14. c(λ) =  τΘAVERAGE m(λ)
and consumer want to maximize net income which is equal to (1 – τ)W(Θ). By calculating first 
derivative of net income with respect to λ we gets:
15. [(1 – τ)W(Θ)]'=(W/m) [m' – (c'/ΘAVERAGE) + (1 – τ)m (h'/h) g', where g'  is a variance of 
estimation error.
As we can see, this outcome depends on λ but also on Θ. If we plug equation 13 into 15 we will see 
that first term is equal to 0 and is only the second one left. More able individuals (with skills above 
the mode) will tend to increase education intensity above desired level, while less able people will 
do the  opposite  and  have less  than  optimal  education  expenditures.  By assuming that  variance 
increase convexly with costs and productivity increases concavely, a single maximum is guaranteed. 
If the median lies below the mode there will be not enough investments , while overinvestment will 
occur if the median is above the mode. Considering income distribution in empirical data, we can 
come to the conclusion that according to this  model,  the majority will  vote to have more than 
optimal levels of investment in education. 
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Picture  6.  Signaling  Theory  with  elements  of  human capital.  Majority  voting  for 
optimal level of education.
Of course, the assumption was made that every person knows his own level of abilities. We can also 
consider the opposite case, where no one knows his abilities to make a decision, solely considering 
education expenditures he undertakes based on the distribution of abilities in general population. In 
that case, the situation changes dramatically and the optimal level of investment will be below the 
optimal one. 
As this model of signaling presents, the optimal solution for society may not always be achieved. 
Although, government regulations may lead to welfare gains, that is not always possible because a 
majority will rather vote to overinvest and therefore will not achieve a desired level of income.
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PART III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF PREVIOUS STUDIES
Human capital theory and signaling hypothesis are two competitive and to some extent an 
elementary hypothesis, which aim at explaining relationships between productivity and education. 
First, let’s assume that by gathering additional knowledge in the school, persons is becoming more 
productive, second, let’s assume that education is completely unproductive and students only are 
proving their high abilities by achieving a higher degree of education. Although, assumptions are 
completely different, predictions can be similar. Lets consider one simple example: Two students 
with similar characteristics, after finishing high school, are considering extending their education 
period at a university. One student has decided to university and after graduating from university, 
has entered the labor market. It turned out that he found better paying job in comparison to his 
counterpart who had only graduated from high school. According to the human capital theory, he 
earns more because he acquired more skills, which had made him more productive. Supporters of 
the signaling hypothesis would argue that he was productive already, but by finishing his studies, he 
was able to prove that his productivity. Although their motivation is different, in both cases the 
outcome is the same – wages are higher for more educated people. It shows that, by having a simple 
wage  regression,  dependently  from  how  we  formulate  the  model,  the  outcomes  can  differ 
significantly.  The  same data  may support  the  human capital  theory if  we will  look for  results 
advocating this theory. If someone prefers screening, he could argue that the data would support this 
theory.  To distinguish effects of these two theories and assess the impact of them on labor and 
education market,  more sophisticated theories were developed.
3.1.Comparisons of returns to accumulated education
One of the first formal procedures of testing validity of the signaling theory were proposed 
by  Layard  and  Psacharopoulos  (1974).  The  authors  based  their  procedures  on  Arrow  (1973) 
signaling model, and tested its three predictions: 
1) Private  returns  are  rather  related  to  achieved  certificates  and  not  to  years  of 
schooling.  Certificates,  according to the theory,  are the proofs of the worker’s  high abilities.  It 
means that the employer is rather interested in the certificates persons achieve, rather than years 
devoted for given course. A similar study was conducted by Ashenfelter and Mooney (1968) and 
was based on 1300 persons sample of Woodrow Wilson fellows. They came to the conclusion that 
variables  like  profession,  degree  level  or  field  of  graduation  explains  more  of  the  variance  in 
earnings than year, when the person graduated. However, the effect of graduating in comparison 
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with bachelor’s degree was positive for Ph.D. and negative for master degree, which cannot be in 
favor of signaling hypothesis.   
2) Standardized educational differentials fall with age, because employers have better 
information about  older  employees’ abilities.  Unfortunately,  comparing earnings  of  groups with 
different education levels shows that this wage gap instead of decreasing, increases over time. One 
of the explanations of this phenomenon is related to on – the – job training. It may be, that better 
educated people are spending more than proportionately share of their income on their training, 
which leads to higher wages growth and lowers the probability of signaling to be true.
3) If screening is the main function of education, it could be done more cheaply by a 
simpler testing procedure.  Existence of a  whole well  developed education system suggested by 
Wiles (1974), argues that it is due to some external effects; persons who had finished their studies 
was (were) tested at the university, so the cost of finding productive graduates is higher than finding 
some similarly productive counterparts from high school graduates. But Layard and Psacharopoulos 
argue that  if  it  was true,  then instead of universities,  on the market would have been agencies 
specializing in evaluating the skill levels of the people.
Although a similar idea of detecting signaling hypothesis was behind work of  Hungerford 
and Solon (1987), the results were different. The authors argued that the database from a previous 
study (made by Layard and Psacharopoulos) lacks information about the exact number of years of 
schooling which  high school dropouts attended. They used May 1978 Current Population Survey 
data on white male nonagricultural wage and salary from workers between the ages of 25 and 64, 
which is definitely a strong point of the work because of quite reliable and precise data and size of 
the sample ( the sample size) is about 16 500 people. They estimated wage regressions to assess the 
impact of diplomas and years of education on a person’s earnings. The outcome of this research 
suggests that the sheepskin effect in the returns of education exists. It is opposite to Layard and 
Psacharopoulos, which previously argued that these effects do not significantly affect the market. 
Moreover, most of the results are significant even at the 1% level. One of author’s findings shows 
that while persons with 16 years of formal education earns almost 14% more than their counterparts 
with 15 years. But, another additional year of schooling increases on average wages by less than 
1%! According to Hungerford and Solon this is strong evidence in favor of the signalling theory.
More research made by basing on a calculated returns to years of education was made by 
Groot and Oosterbeek in 1994. Innovation in their research was dividing years of schooling into 
actual, effective, repeated and skipped, which according to the results increased precision of the 
estimates.  They  used  data  for  people  from  the  same  age  cohort  (born  in  1940)  born  in  the 
Netherlands came to the conclusion that the human capital theory largely explains education market 
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situation, while the signaling hypothesis has no use. Results shows negative correlation of skipped 
classes, class – failing has no effect and positive effect of dropout years. Another crucial finding is 
that  their  way of dividing years of education is  superior  to usually used concept  of actual and 
effective years.
The last paper based on this type of estimation was written by Frazis (2002). His study is 
on The US Current Population Survey gives ambiguous results.  It turned out that  graduation is 
related to a quite high increase in earnings, while the previous 15 years before achieving diploma 
gives a sub – normal return. He argued that on one hand, the human capital theory is sufficiently 
elastic to explain this kind of behavior but abnormal behavior of rates of return during these 15 
years. If no, one can argue that this result is caused by measurement error and supports the signaling 
theory.  But assuming importance of signaling in  determining length of studying,  we are facing 
problem of explaining very low returns to few very last years of studying.
3.2.Comparisons of wages between unmatched job group and matched job (Wiles Test)
The method proposed by Wiles (1974) was based on a comparison of wage differences 
between people who are working on the position that is consistent with the given person’s education 
and those whose working profile is different than this in which he specialized during the studies. If 
a market behaves according to the signaling hypothesis, then the type of knowledge, or skills a 
person gains in school will have no effect on person’s productivity. Opposite with human capital, 
then in a job where the person was educated, his productivity will be higher than in unmatched job, 
because of the courses he had taken, allow him to better understand his field of work. If we assume 
that the market is perfectly competitive then productivity will be equal to wages. So the differences 
in wages between matched and unmatched jobs can be good indicator of the significance of two 
competitive  theories.  As  usual,  problems  occur  with  precise  definitions  of  “matched”  and 
“unmatched” jobs. Usually, when conducting this kind of estimation, the researcher must rely on 
respondent assessment of how the job matches his education. This data may be biased due to big 
subjectivity of answers. Person who is satisfied with his job and earnings may be more prone to 
answer  that  his  education  is  matched.  Another  argument  against  this  estimation  method  was 
proposed by Miller  and Volker (1984).  They argued that the fact  that  science graduates do not 
receive significantly higher wages do not necessarily support the signaling theory. Alternatively, it 
may mean that skills acquired during science studies may be equally productive in matched and 
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unmatched professions. They conducted research based on a survey from Australian universities. 
Two types of students were extracted – economics and science graduates. Results are ambiguous:
− male economics graduates tend to have a similar level of earnings no matter if the job is 
matched or not
− for  females,  no  matter  if  they  were  economic  or  science  graduates,  predictions  of  the 
signaling theory hold
− male  science  graduates  opposite  to  the  rest  of  the  groups  had  significantly  higher  (6% 
higher)  starting  wages  when  they  were  employed  on  posts  which  required  science 
knowledge.
Also using Wiles Test Arabsheibani found strong evidence of human capital on Egypt’s 
labor market. Graduates in medical, natural and social science, irrespective of the degree, always 
achieved higher  earnings  in  matched than  unmatched jobs.  In  other  words,  skill  they acquired 
significantly increased productivity which is completely in line with the human capital theory.
Chung (1990) was another author, who published research based on matched – unmatched 
job comparison.  He used data  about  different  types  of vocational  education (mechanics,  textile 
production).  His results  show that the earnings between matched and unmatched jobs were not 
significant and even sometimes persons employed in unmatched job earn more than his counterpart 
in matched one. He came to the conclusion that after controlling for different wage determinants, a 
person’s wage is almost always unrelated to his education, and according to him, not the education 
but  the  branch  of  industry  in  which  given  person  is  employed  is  main  determinant  of  wages 
differences. This is another finding that supports signaling.
Last Author I want to mention, which employed Wiles test was Merwe (2010). He based 
his research on recent graduates’ record from Durban University of Technology. Results of these 
studies are to some extent inconclusive. It turned out that the more relevant training was, the lower 
the wages were. One of possible explanation of this phenomenon is that most of the students’ job is 
related to their internship, so the increase in wages is gradual and in the long run this relationship is 
positive.  On  the  other  hand,  employers  do  not  believe  that  the  training  increases  productivity 
instantly and treats it as some kind of liability.
3.3.Comparisons of  returns to absolute years of  schooling and the relative ranking of 
education
Another interesting way of estimating this effect is comparing total years of education with 
individual position in the distribution of education in a given cohort. Intuition behind this method of 
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estimation is as follows: Distribution of education of a given cohort may significantly vary between 
years (for example, due to limited access to higher education in a war period or shortly after it). If 
the wages reflect a given person’s number of years in school, then it is an argument in favor of the 
human capital theory. On the other hand, if wages of people with the same level of education but 
from different cohorts it suggests that wages depend not only on a given person’s education but its 
relative position to others. So, high school graduates from a cohort which faced limited access to 
education earning more than his counterpart from the cohort with better access to education, will 
mean that education is treated as a  signal of higher abilities. That was a method of estimation 
proposed  by  Kroch  and  Sjoblam (1994).  The  strong  point  of  their  research  is  that  instead  of 
estimating a single one regression, they calculated the results for eight independent samples and 
explored many specifications of time and schooling variables. Although the estimation results are 
ambiguous, it usually supports the human capital theory. Earnings are rather determined by number 
of years a person had spent in school than rank of this education in his cohort. 
3.4.Comparison  of  relative  access  to  tertiary  education  with  number  of  high  school 
dropouts
One of the last methods of estimation I want to mention about the use the prediction that 
the sheepskin effect is more likely to occur in regions where access to education is limited. If high a 
productivity worker has only very limited amount of years he can study (for example due to lack of 
university networks) then low – skilled workers are more prone to finish high school to earn more. 
When  access  to  a  university  is  assured,  low skill  workers  knows  that  the  equilibrium will  be 
differentiating and not pooling one. Then, this group looses the motivation, because (according to 
signaling hypothesis) it is completely unproductive. That is the reason why, if signaling holds then 
having  better  access  to  a  university  will  lead  to  more  high  school  dropouts.  Better  access  to 
universities will lead to more school dropouts is graphically presented below.
Bedard (2001) conducted research based on National Longitudinal Surveys of Young Men 
(NLSYM) and Young Women (NLSYW). According to her estimates, we can observe signaling on 
the market because access to universities significantly explained number of high school dropouts.
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 Picture 7. Impact of better access to tertiary education on high school dropouts
3.5.Assessing impact of change in obligatory school attendance age.
Lang and Kropp (1986) were researching the impact of compulsory school attendance laws 
on groups which attended universities. Their paper was based on selected censuses made in the 
years 1908–1970 in United States. It occurred that during this period of time, different states were 
adopting significantly different CALs (Compulsory Attendance Laws) and this structure was not 
constant over time. In estimation, the authors used GLS method and rejected the human capital 
theory.
Hamalainen  and  Uusitalo  (2008)  were  detecting  signals  on  the  Finnish  labor  market. 
Fortunate  circumstances  occurred,  when  government  announced  educational  system  reform. 
Vocational colleges were gradually replaced by polytechnics, which changed the structure of the 
labor force. The change according to different theories will have different outcomes:
− signaling  states  that  people,  from  vocational  colleges  will  earn  less  than  their 
counterparts from polytechnics because their signal is relatively weaker(labor maket will percept 
them as of inferior abilities)
− human capital assumes that this change will not affect wages of vocational colleges 
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alumnus.
The  authors  conclude  that  such  decrease  in  wages  occurred  so  there  is  some  use  of 
signaling theory in explaining labor market behavior in Finland. This way of testing is very similar 
to Kroch and Sjoblam (1994). The main difference is type of the data. Previous studies used time 
series while the latter was based on different types of schools in Finland, but at the same time. 
Although with different estimation techniques, we can achieve different results, which shows how 
complex is the problem of implementing/rejecting competitive theories.
 Chevalier, Harmon, Walker and Zhu (2004) also used obligatory school attendance laws as 
their method of estimation. Based on UK data concerning the 1970's, they did not find any support 
to signaling theory.
Table 1. Summary of previous researches.
No Author Estimation 
method
result year of publication
1. Layard  and 
Psacharopoulos
1 no 
signaling
1974
2. Hungerford and Solon 1 signaling 1987
3. Groot and Oosterbeek 1 no 
signaling
1994
4. Frazis 1 undecided 2002
5. Miller and Volker 2 signaling 1984
6. Arabsheibani 2 no 
signaling
1989
7. Chung 2 signaling 1990
8. Kroch and Sjoblam 3 usually 
support 
human 
capital
1994
9. Bedard 4 signaling 2001
10. Lang and Kropp 5 signaling 1986
11. Hamalainen  and 
Uusitalo
5 signaling 2008
12. Chevalier,  Harmon, 
Walker and Zhu
5 No 
signaling
2004
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Part IV. Data Description
4.1.PGSS
In  my  model,  I  am  using  a  data  sample  from Polski  Generalny  Sondaż  Społeczny  - 
Diagnoza Społeczna  (Polish General Social Survey – Social Diagnosis) conducted in years 1992 – 
1995 and in 1997. The whole sample consists of 8910 observations, 1647 of which (82,4% of the 
chosen representative sample agreed to answer questionnaire),  comes from 1992, 1649 from 1993 
(82,5% of the chosen sample), 1609 from 1994 (80,5% of the chosen sample), 1603 observations 
were recorded in  1995 (80,2%of the sample)  and rest  2402 observations came from year  1997 
(which is 75,1% of extended to 3200 people representative sample). PGSS (Polish General Social 
Survey) is a part of statutory research made by Institute of Social Studies on Warsaw University. 
The data was collected through surveys on representative samples of household members above age 
of 18. The main goal of this project is to systematically measure trends and causes of social changes 
in Poland. It also measure differentiation of personal views, beliefs, social behavior and social – 
demographic,  occupational,  educational  and  economical  differentiation  of  representative  social 
groups in Poland. A large advantage of this program is that questionnaires are only slightly modified 
and research is conducted on a yearly basis (since 1997 once every three years). Continuation of 
this  research  using  the  same indexes  and similar  methodological  standards  make  this  database 
unique for Poland and very neat tool to conduct a time series or cross section analysis concerning 
Polish Society. Another significant advantage of this survey is that it is available for free on the 
website of institute of social studies (www.iss.uw.edu.pl). A very nice feature of this database is 
that  it  includes modules which are  asked also by institutions  in  many other  countries,  like the 
International Social  Survey Programme (ISSP).  Some of these modules are  repeated every few 
years in other countries, which allows international comparisons – even in a dynamic perspective. 
Moreover, part of questionnaires are exactly the same as those conducted by  General Social Survey 
(GSS)  made  by  National  Opinion  Research  Center  from  University  of  Chicago  and  German 
nationwide program of  surveys  ALLBUS conducted by Zentrum fur  Umfragen,  Methoden und 
Analysen from Mannheim.
Another significant argument in favor of this database is its complexity in dealing with 
such spheres like:
− Professional position and labor market participation, which comprises international 
standards of profession classification, sector in which they are employed, type of ownership, size 
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and localization of the given firm. Also included are variables characterizing working experience 
and periods of unemployment. Data contains also analogical variables for spouses and parents of 
the respondent.
− Level  and  specialization  of  education  with  inclusion  of  analogical  variables  of 
respondent spouse and parents.
− Material  situation  of  respondent  and  his  family  described  by  personal  level  of 
income,  level  of  income  of  whole  household,  accommodation  conditions,  household  goods, 
satisfaction from income etc.
− Respondent’s subjective perception of social position and its changes over time
− Respondent’s beliefs, views on politics, society, government credibility, participation 
in civic life, religious view ethics and even on his/her attitude toward alcohol and cigarettes. 
Although large sample, multiplicity of questions in questionnaire and possibility of cross-
country comparisons, several weak points of the database can be pointed out.  
First of all, knowledge about the respondent’s education was sometimes in my opinion not 
sufficient.  An  argument  supporting  my  thesis  is  that  additional  educational  indicators,  which 
represent exact school attendance period of time, precise profile and mode of education, type of 
ownership of the schools and their localization were not included until 1997. This kind of data 
could shed new light on signaling and the human capital theory, and provide deeper insight in this 
problem.
Another  troublesome  disadvantage  of  PGSS  is  its  insufficient  data  about  individual 
migrations within the country. There is a lack of data about respondent’s place of living when he 
was teenager and was deciding about his level of education. Although this data would have been 
very useful in my research, a lack of it does not make the estimation impossible. First of all, both 
models (human capital and signaling) assume that individuals are rational. If that is the case, they 
are rather concerned not with situation on labor market in region they were raised, but in condition 
on labor market they were participating during the time survey was conducted. What is more, if 
they were not rational and choose the education that was not optimal for “their” market conditions, 
there is always a solution to the problem in the form of migration. Still, the fact is that 66% of 
individuals that were included in this research, were in time of collecting surveys in a city of similar 
size that the city of their youth. This means that no mass scale migration was made, that could blur 
the estimation results.
There  are  some other  imperfections  in  that  data  set  related  with  questions  concerning 
respondent youth. For example, Bedard (2001) when trying to distinguish between many factors 
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affecting people’s willingness to achieve education included dummy variable corresponding having 
(or not) a library card or number of siblings. Unfortunately, this type of data is does not exists in the 
questionnaires constructed for PGSS. This makes estimation a bit less precise than with the data. 
Another stunning thing is when question concern for example father, stepfather or another man that 
was taking care of a child, answers that there were not such that person are virtually absent. This 
does not help us to describe more appropriate situation of a person during his childhood.  
4.2.Variables in the model
a) Level of education [degree]
Structure of the schooling system in Poland at that time was as follows:
Picture 8. Schooling structure in Poland
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The most  crucial  variable  in  this  model  is  people  from the  sample education level.  A 
question  that  respondents  had to  ask was:  “What  level  of  education have  you achieved up till 
now?”. The nicest feature of this question was that no one answered: not remember or other reasons 
of lack of data were not pointed out by any of the respondents. The other results are as follows: 
Table 2. Distribution of education in the sample.
The thing which needed here to be explained is so – called tertiary ratio. This ratio shows 
us the relative share of students in given voivodeship. It is constructed by dividing share of students 
in population of given voivodeship by share of students in population in Poland. Ratio above one 
means that in comparison with the country’s average, given administration has a better developed 
tertiary  education  infrastructure.  On  the  other  hand,  ratios  lower  than  one  means  that  the 
infrastructure in a given year, in given voivodeship, is weaker developed and people are facing 
more obstacles in continuing education on the universities comparing to country average. Ratio was 
updated on a yearly basis, every year calculating new values for given voivodeship.
b) Voivodeship [voivo49]
One of the main problems, that researcher needs to face when dealing with Polish data are 
the very short periods of time when data was collected in the same way. Source of this state of 
things were quite often changing borders of the country. The oldest persons that were included in 
PGSS were  born  in  1897,  so  before  the  first  World  War.  At  that  time Poland  was  partitioned 
between three neighboring empires: Austro-Hungarian, German and Russian. Every of the invading 
countries  had  its  own unique  administrative  division  which  makes  comparisons  between  them 
impossible. 
In the period of time between the world wars, when Poland finally regained independence, 
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No. distribution of entire ratio above 1 ratio below 1
1 education men women men women men women
2 none 0,02 0,01 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,01
3 incomplete primary 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 primary 0,13 0,12 0,12 0,11 0,15 0,12
5 basic vocational 0,44 0,28 0,41 0,23 0,46 0,3
6 highschool droput 0,02 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,02 0,03
7 highschool graduate 0,02 0,1 0,03 0,11 0,02 0,1
8 secondary vocational 0,24 0,26 0,21 0,28 0,23 0,25
9 post-secondary 0,02 0,08 0,03 0,09 0,02 0,08
10 incomplete tertiary 0,03 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,02 0,04
11 tertiary 0,08 0,08 0,11 0,1 0,07 0,07
comparisons  between  voivodeship  were  possible.  On  the  end  of  1925,  when  status  of  all 
administrative  units  was  regulated,  there  were  16  voivodeships  (plus  the  capital  city)  and  281 
districts. But this division was quite often changed in the following years. Some of the districts 
changed their voivodeships, some were liquidated, etc. This makes comparisons using data from 
years 1918 – 1939 were hard and results may not be too reliable due to many changes of the system 
and quite short period of time. Map of this administrative division was presented below.
Picture 9. Administrative map of Poland in 1938
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In a short period of time, different administrative units and large scale external effects makes 
estimation of signaling and human capital theories during World War II impossible.
The most stable over time borders in Poland over time in the 20th century are those after 
World War II till now. That is the reason why I am focusing on that period of time. At that time, 
borders of administrative units changed several times. Periods of constant administrative division 
are as follows:
• Administrative division 1944 – 50   
• Administrative division 1950 – 57  
• Administrative division 1957 – 75   
• Administrative division 1975 – 98  
• Administrative division 1998 – present 
So as we can see above, the longest period of a stable number of voivodeships are in the years 1975 
–  1998.  Unfortunately,  restricting  samples  only  to  people,  which  were  deciding  about  their 
education  in  those  years  significantly  decreased  the  number  of  observations.  From  8910 
observations in whole database,  only 3816 were born at  that  time. It  is much lower than 5896 
observations  which  were  used  by  Bedard  (2001).  But  still,  it  is  quite  a  large  sample,  which 
guarantees reliability of the results. Another argument in favor of this division is the average size of 
the voivodeships, which was 6583 km2 in comparison with 24 357 km2 in period between the World 
Wars. A large decrease in administrative units’ size allows us to have deeper look at variability of 
education infrastructure between the regions. A good example here is voivodeship Mazowieckie, 
which existed before 1975 (as Warszawskie voivodeship) and in slightly different shape,  it  was 
reactivated in 1998. According to all statistics, it  is one of the best developed regions with the 
highest  average  earnings  and  with  very  good  developed  tertiary  infrastructure.  But  when  the 
statistics are calculated for this region without the capital city, then it occurs that the region is much 
below the average! Using administrative division with such small units like 49 voivodeships makes 
the view on the problem less blurred and guarantees that only the nearest regional capital city and 
its  neighborhood will  be  included.  It  will  eliminate  the  bias  of  large  cities  on  underdeveloped 
regions placed few hundred kilometers from each other. Last but not least, an argument in favor of 
time between administrative reform in 1975 and 1998 is  the fact  that  on one hand it  does not 
include rapid rebuilding shortly after Second World War and also significant  increase in number of 
private colleges and high schools in the second half of the 90's.  Administrative map of Poland is 
presented below.
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Picture 10. Administrative map of Poland in years 1975 - 1998
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voivodeship shortcut capital city voivodeship shortcut capital city
1 Stołeczne Warszawskie wa Warsaw 26 Olsztyńskie ol Olsztyn
2 Bialskopodlaskie bp Biała Podlaska 27 Opolskie op Opole
3 Białostockie bk Białystok 28 Ostrołęckie os Ostrołęka
4 Bielskie bb Bielsko Biała 29 Pilskie pi Piła
5 Bydgoskie by Bydgoszcz 30 Piotrowskie ptt Piotrków Trybunalski
6 Chełmskie ch Chełm 31 Płockie pl Płock
7 Ciechanowskie ci Ciechanów 32 Poznańskie po Poznań
8 Częstochowskie czz Częstochowa 33 Przemyskie pr Przemyśl
9 Elbląskie el Elbląg 34 Radomskie ra Radom
10 Gdańskie gd Gdańsk 35 Rzeszowskie rz Rzeszów
11 Gorzowskie go Gorzów 36 Siedleckie se Siedlce
12 Jeleniogórskie jg Jelenia Góra 37 Sieradzkie si Sieradz
13 Kaliskie kl Kalisz 38 Skierniewickie sk Skierniewice
14 Katowickie ka Katowice 39 Słupskie sl Słupsk
15 Kieleckie ki Kielce 40 Suwalskie su Suwałki
16 Konińskie kn Konin 41 Szczecińskie sz Szczecin
17 Koszalińskie ko Koszalin 42 Tarnobrzeskie tg Tarnobrzeg
18 Miejskie krakowskie kr Cracow 43 Tarnowskie ta Tarnów
19 Krośnieńskie ld Krosno 44 Toruńskie to Toruń
20 Legnickie lg Legnica 45 Wałbrzyskie wb Wałbrzych
21 Leszczyńskie le Leszno 46 Włocławskie wl Włocławek
22 Lubelskie lu Lublin 47 Wrocławskie wr Wrocław
23 Łomżyńskie lo Łomża 48 Zamojskie za Zamość
24 Miejskie Łódzkie ld Łódź 49 Zielonogórskie zg Zielona Góra
25 Nowosądeckie ns Nowy Sącz
c) Tertiary ratio [tertiary_ratio]
As we can see below there is no strict geographical rule conditioning being or not local 
center of tertiary education. A bit less developed is eastern part of Poland comparing to the west. 
The only two big exceptions are in Białystok and Lublin, major cities in the east, which had almost 
twice as many students comparing to average. On the center, not counting Warsaw, there are no 
leading  voivodeships.  Most  of  them are  in  interval  between  0,5  and  1,5.  The  western  part  is 
characterized  by large differences  between two main  centers  of  tertiary education:  Poznań and 
Wrocław comparing to neighboring voivodeships. 
Picture 11. Tertiary ratio in Poland by voivodeship in year 1997
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As a rule monocentric agglomeration (Warsaw, Cracow, Poznań or Wrocław) tend to have better 
developed networks of univerisites than conurbations (Tricity or Upper Silesian conurbation). 
d) Size of the city [size]
Another important variable, which was used in estimations was used in the model was the 
size of the city, in which the respondent lives. Respondents were asked about: 
Table 3. Relationship between place of residence and access to universities.
We can see that people living in cities with a population bigger than 500 thousands citizens 
have on average, 2,6 times bigger access to tertiary education in comparison with the countries 
average. Surprisingly,  not the people living on (in) the village have the most difficult access to 
tertiary education.  It is becaused that, although polish villages are characterized by underdeveloped 
infrastructure,  some of them are located quite close to big academical centers,  which shifts  the 
average  up.  On  the  other  hand,  there  are  towns  sufficiently  large  enough  to  be  capital  of  a 
voivodeship, but are insufficiently large enough to develop universities. That can be the reason why 
PGSS respondents have in general higher tertiary ratio if are leaving in the village in comparison 
with towns between 50 and 250 thousands people.
e) Parents Education
Parents’ education is thought to have significant impact on a degree a person achieves. In 
the  Polish  General  Social  Survey  respondents  were  asked,  what  is  their  parents  their  highest 
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No. residence in Tertiary ratio 
1 village 0,72
2 Town<10 0,6
3 Town 10-24 0,8
4 Town 25-49 0,72
5 Town 50-99 0,56
6 Town 100-249 0,6
7 City 250-499 1,28
8 City>500 2,6
attained degree? As can be observed below, in general the more educated respondent parents were, 
the more on average he had spent in school. 
Table 4. Impact of parents education on respondent achieved degree.
f) Other control variables
In estimating intensity of the signaling in polish labor market other control variables were 
included in order to prevent results to be biased. This includes respondents’ sex [sex] and year he 
was born [cohort].
45
No. attained level of education father education m other education
1 none 7,33 7,33
2 incom plete prim ary 7,43 7,25
3 prim ary 7,43 7,22
4 bas ic  vocational 8,42 8,13
5 highschool droput 9,96 9,05
6 highschool graduate 10,3 9,99
7 secondary  vocational 9,5 9,01
8 pos t-secondary 10,05 9,87
9 incom plete tertiary 11,99 11,76
10 tertiary 11,81 11,21
PART V. ESTIMATION
Before estimating results, several changes in the data were made. First of all, levels of 
education needed to be reorganized slightly because of relatively high abundance of degree levels 
but relatively small abundance of observations in some levels. No education or not full primary was 
chosen by about 0,2% of the people. Percentage of people that finished post – secondary schools, 
secondary school dropouts or those who did not managed to finish their studies are also not too big. 
I combined groups together with degrees as high as completed primary education and named this 
group 1. Group 2 includes secondary school dropouts and basic vocational school alumnus. Their 
main feature is that although they were attending some post-primary school, but did not finish their 
studies with Matura exam (it is a polish counterpart of the British GCSE). So, this group is not 
allowed to apply to university.  To do that they should have finished secondary school or go to 
secondary technical/general  supplementary school.  That  is  the  motivation  behind  organizing  in 
group 3, high school and technical secondary graduates together. The last – 4th  group consists of 
alumnus of post – secondary schools, universities and university dropouts. 
To estimate if the students’ behavior is according to the human capital or signaling theory, I 
used multinomial logit and ordered probit models. Comparing access to universities with people, 
who continued school after finishing primary but did not take the Matura exam, is analogical type 
of estimation Bedard (2001), which was wider described in third chapter.
Another important thing worth mentioning is before proceeding to estimation,  is that  I 
assumed a rational agent to decide at the age of 16 on his future education. Primary school at that 
time lasted 8 years and general secondary school 4 years. So in general, we can say that persons 
leave (or decide to continue education to achieve Matura exam) his secondary school after two 
years of studies. Time, when rational agents are  making decision about their studies, they are on 
average 16. That is the reason why tertiary ratio of given year was matched with the respondents 
that were 16 at that time. After restricting the data, it turned out that the sample consists of 3374 
observations; 1620 of them are men and 1754 women. Below given is following multinomial logit 
regression.  The  base  outcome  of  this  regression  is  group  2,  so  here  are  presented  impacts  of 
different  variables  in  comparison  with  people  from high  school  dropouts  and basic  vocational 
school graduates. As we can see, all of the signs are correct with predictions. The most crucial 
variable  for  this  paper  is  tertiary ratio.  As  we can  see  for  the  third  group (secondary schools 
graduates), this variable is significant at 1%! So the access to university in the region has an impact 
on post-primary students who do not take Matura exam. What is more, this effect is negative, which 
support the predictions of the signaling theory. People with worse access to universities have greater 
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motivation to finish secondary education and not to be recognized as low productivity
Table 5. Multinomial logistic regression determining respondent education level
worker. On the other hand, people living in regions with better access to tertiary education knows 
that they cannot pretend to be high quality, because finishing university would cost them too much 
and it is better to not have even secondary education finished and be recognized as less able worker.
To check the robustness of my estimation I have made another regression. Using the same 
data I estimate ordered probit model. The results are as follows:
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Primary Secondary Tertiary
No. school Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
1 Size 2 -0.18 0.25 0.79* 0.18 1.06* 0.23
2 Size 3 -0.62* 0.23 0.66* 0.15 0.52** 0.20
3 Size 4 -0.5** 0.24 0.53* 0.16 0.51** 0.21
4 Size 5 -0.42*** 0.23 0.67* 0.15 0.67* 0.20
5 Size 6 -0.51** 0.23 0.61* 0.15 0.45** 0.20
6 Size 7 -0.22 0.28 0.78* 0.19 0.84* 0.23
7 Size 8 -0.48 0.33 1.14* 0.20 1.12* 0.25
8 sex  0.19*** 0.12 0.89* 0.09 1.10* 0.12
9 cohort -0.24** 0.01 -0.04* 0.01 -0.08* 0.01
10 paeduc -0.11* 0.03 0.14* 0.02 0.25* 0.03
11 maeduc -0.06*** 0.03 0.12* 0.02 0.31* 0.03
12 tertiary ratio -0.10 0.07 -0.15* 0.06 -0.07
13 constant  46.6228** 19.0146 66.4589** 14.0200 148.0935 18.0883
*-significance level 1% secondary school dropouts and basic vocational alumnis are base level
**-significance level 5% Pseudo R2=13%
***-significance level 10%
Table 6. Ordered probit regression determining respondent education level
Table  7.  Ordered  probit  regression  determining  respondent  education  level  with 
inclusion of tertiary ratio squared
Almost the same as before, most of the variables are important and with signs as expected. 
The stunning variable is tertiary ratio which is insignificant at any reliable significance level. Does 
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No. school Coef. Std. Err.
1 Size 2 0.45* 0.08
2 Size 3 0.38* 0.07
3 Size 4 0.34* 0.07
4 Size 5 0.38* 0.07
5 Size 6 0.33* 0.07
6 Size 7 0.42* 0.08
7 Size 8 0.57* 0.09
8 sex 0.37* 0.04
9 cohort -0.02* 0.01
10 paeduc 0.11* 0.01
11 maeduc 0.11* 0.01
12 tertiary ratio -0.16 0.02
*-significance level 1% Pseudo R2=11%
**-significance level 5%
***-significance level 10%
No. school Coef. Std. Err.
1 Size 2 0.45* 0.08
2 Size 3 0.39* 0.07
3 Size 4 0.35* 0.07
4 Size 5 0.39* 0.07
5 Size 6 0.35* 0.07
6 Size 7 0.46* 0.08
7 Size 8 0.54* 0.09
8 sex 0.37* 0.04
9 cohort -0.02* 0.01
10 paeduc 0.11* 0.01
11 maeduc 0.11** 0.01
12 tertiary ratio -0.14* 0.06
13 ratio squared0.05** 0.02
*-significance level 1% Pseudo R2=12%
**-significance level 5%
***-significance level 10%
it mean that in the previous model tertiary ratio was significant only due to specification of the 
model.  Not  necessary,  Bedard  argued  that  better  access  to  university  causes  more  high  school 
dropouts on one hand, but on the other, of course, more people will go to university. So the impact 
of tertiary ratio is according to the signaling theory non – linear.  That's why I made additional 
regression with tertiary ratio to the power of 2.
The results shows that impact of easy university access has a parabolic shape. On both 
endings  it  is  positive (higher  quantity of less educated people and university alumnus).  This is 
another argument in favor of existence of ability signaling on labor market in Poland during the end 
of communistic and beginning of capitalistic period. 
In the end I estimated the model separately for males and females.
 Table  8.  Multinomial  logistic  regression  determining  respondent  education  level 
calculated exclusively for men
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Primary Secondary Tertiary
No. school Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
1 Size 2 -0.63 0.37 0.83* 0.26 1.16* 0.35
2 Size 3 -1.15* 0.35 0.63* 0.23 0.85* 0.31
3 Size 4 -0.99* 0.37 0.47*** 0.24 0.43 0.34
4 Size 5 -0.70** 0.31 0.45** 0.23 0.63** 0.31
5 Size 6 -1.02* 0.36 0.85* 0.22 0.53*** 0.32
6 Size 7 0.02 0.41 0.98* 0.30 0.93** 0.37
7 Size 8 -0.40 0.47 1.33* 0.31 0.81** 0.38
8 cohort -0.01 0.01 -0.04* 0.01 -0.08* 0.01
9 paeduc -0.07*** 0.04 0.20* 0.03 0.32* 0.04
10 maeduc -0.11** 0.04 0.12* 0.04 0.28* 0.04
11 tertiary ratio-0.20** 0.10 -0.27* 0.09 0.07 0.12
12 constant 30.1069 25.7001 78.7547* 20.5968 143.6721 27.6434
 Table  9.  Multinomial  logistic  regression  determining  respondent  education  level 
calculated exclusively for women
If we look carefully, we can see that crucial variable (impact of tertiary ratio on secondary 
schools dropouts comparing to secondary schools graduates) is strongly significant for men but 
completely insignificant for women. This result is completely astonishing due to the fact we are 
talking about the same labor market, officially without any discriminatory laws introduced. I have 
two explanations of this result or outcome. First, it can be the case of “lower level equilibrium trap” 
proposed  by  Spence(1973).  He  argued  that  even  if  we  have  two  groups  with  the  same 
characteristics, but with different one indices (for example sex) that is correlated with the signaling 
process. According to him, “M and W, at the level of signaling, (…) can generate many different 
possible equilibrium configuration..”6 It can be true because women, usually study longer than men. 
In  the sample from PGSS average man had studied 10,02 years  while  woman on average had 
studied for 11,55 years before finish her education. So if a man was thinking about taking or not 
Matura  exam,  woman may decided  between finishing  general  secondary and post  –  secondary 
school. 
Another  possible  explanation is  due to  market  discrimination.  It  may be that  on more 
creative positions, men are employed. These positions require rather than certain skills, which can 
be learned in school, unobservable abilities, which cannot be learned but able person can somehow 
signal that he is appropriate for this post. So due to discrimination, different theories may explain 
the behavior of men and women even if they are of the same productivity.
6
Spence, A. Michael, "Job Market Signaling," Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 1973, 87, 355-74.
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Primary Secondary Tertiary
No. school Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
1 Size 2 -0.48 0.34 -0.80* 0.27 0.24 0.30
2 Size 3 -0.82* 0.31 -0.73* 0.21 -0.37 0.25
3 Size 4 -0.67** 0.32 -0.64* 0.23 -0.03 0.26
4 Size 5 -0.91* 0.33 -0.92* 0.22 -0.11 0.25
5 Size 6 -0.48 0.30 -0.44** 0.21 -0.03 0.25
6 Size 7 -1.01* 0.38 -0.62** 0.24 0.11 0.27
7 Size 8 -1.55* 0.48 -1.01* 0.28 0.30 0.30
8 cohort 0.01 0.01 0,33* 0.01 -0.05* 0.01
9 paeduc -0.26* 0.05 -0.08** 0.03 -0.09** 0.03
10 maeduc -0.12* 0.05 -0.12* 0.03 0.22* 0.04
11 tertiary ratio0.07 0.11 -0.07 0.08 -0.07 0.09
12 constant 1.4265 28.7253 -62.4286 19.4658 91.5638 22.0421
PART VI. CONCLUSIONS
Two competitive theories try to explain human behavior during decision making about 
prolonging (or not) their education. Both of them predicts that peoples’ motivation for investing in 
education is related to hope of having privileged position on the labor market. Both predict that 
better  educated persons can expect higher earnings.  But the impact of education on the overall 
economics differs significantly among the models. 
Human Capital assumes that the outcome of perfectly competitive markets without any 
interventions  will  maximize  the  total  output  of  the  economy.  It  is  because  personal  return  to 
education is equal to the social one. That provides a Pareto efficient solution.
The situation is completely different when a competitive theory is applied. According to 
the simplest model of signaling skills, education decreases net output of the economy and increases 
inequalities in earnings. Although Stiglitz (1975) argued that “if, as a result of better organized (for 
example, by using more homogenous assembly lines) then there is a kind of externality provided by 
the availability of information”7, even he came to the conclusion that there is no certainty that the 
market outcome will be the efficient one. This suggests that government can by use of appropriate 
tools  to  improve  the  situation  on  the  market.  It  is  argued  that  by  levying  tax  on  educational 
institutions,  obtained equilibrium will  be better  than market outcome.  By equalizing social  and 
private benefits of education, we can improve situation of all market participants. It is especially 
important if the government could find and limit phenomenon of investing “too much” in education 
in order to distinguish low from high productivity workers.
As this research has shown on Polish labor market, there exists an effect of signaling skills 
to potential employers. It shows that role of the state on education is crucial and may improve 
present  condition of the economy.  Governance by lowering age till  which school  attendance is 
compulsory may increase overall wealth. Another important policy that I recommend is easing the 
barriers for people living far from traditional academic centers to have better  access to tertiary 
education. In total, these two policies (assurance of more equal access to tertiary education and a 
decrease in an average number of years spent in schools) may on one hand decrease spending on 
education and on the other side increase matching of people with appropriate skills to appropriate 
post.
On the other hand, lawmakers should have on their mind that the equilibrium differs not 
only for people with access to universities in comparison with those without,  but also between 
genders. Women’s behavior is rather determined by the human capital theory than the screening 
7
Stiglitz, Joseph, "The Theory of Screening Education and the Distribution of Income," American Economic Review, June 1975, 65, p.288.
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hypothesis. It means that different policy must be implemented to both sexes. As summary statistic 
shows, women usually spend more years in schools, although on average their earnings are lower. 
This is one of the predictions of signaling model, which state that more education (which is not 
productive) if do not improve information about the skills lead to decrease in income.  On the other 
hand, results of the logistic estimation suggest that this theory fails to explain women’s behavior. It 
could mean strong discrimination based on a sex. That is the reason why anti-discriminatory police 
is also required.
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Abstract
This work discusses the impact of signaling on individuals’ decisions to continue education. 
Based on a  variety of predictions of signaling and human capital  theory,  this  work empirically 
examines the importance of signaling education system alumnus about his productivity. The data 
used  in  research  came from PGSS (Polish  General  Social  Survey –  Social  Diagnosis),  sample 
restricted for the years 1975 – 1998 due to administrative changes. It  proves that the signaling 
hypothesis  cannot  be  omitted  if  the  behavior  of  Poles  in  the  education  market  is  to  be  fully 
explained.
Zusammenfassung
Der  Gegenstand  dieser  Arbeit  ist  der  Einfluss  des  Signalling  Phänomens  auf  die 
persönlichen  Bildungsentscheidungen.  Aufbauend  auf  der  Signalling  Theorie  und  der 
Humankapitaltheorie untersucht diese Arbeit, wie die Tatsache, dass Ausbildung ein Signal für hohe 
Produktivität  sein  kann,  Bildungsentscheidungen  von  einzelner  Personen  beeinflusst.  Die  dazu 
verwendeten  Daten  stammen  aus  der  Polnischen  Allgemeinen  Gesellschaftsumfrage  (Polski 
Generalny Sondaż Społeczny), wobei der Datensatz wegen einer Administrationsreform nur auf die 
Jahre  1975-1998  beschränkt  wurde.  Aus  der  Analyse  geht  hervor,  dass  die  Signalling  Theorie 
notwendig ist um das Verhalten von Polen am Arbeitsmarkt zu erklären.
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